. Launched in 2007, it provides an opportunity for staff, associated researchers and fellows to disseminate original research and policy advice on a wide range of subjects. All papers are peer reviewed within the School. Recent past work, provided it meets the standards required and has contemporary significance is also welcome.
Introduction
Many religious establishments have reported a steep decline in outward religious expression and participation in recent years. According to the latest estimates of the World Values Survey Dataset (2009) 1 , the percentage of those who regularly attend religious services has fallen below 5% in countries such as Sweden, Norway and Estonia. A recent report on church attendance in the UK by the development NGO Tearfund (2007) suggests that only 15% of the population attend church services at least monthly. Moreover, church attendance appears to be more prevalent amongst older people. The share of regular church attendants in the UK is 26% for those 1 The World Value Survey is carried out by a global academic network of social scientists, surveying the basic values and beliefs of the public in different societies and provides international data on religiosity for a large number of countries.
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DEV Working Paper 21 5 above the age of 65 compared to 11% for those between the age of 16 and 44 (Christian Society, 2008) . These figures confirm earlier findings by Smith (1993) on declining church participation and youth membership in Scotland.
However, religiosity is neither low nor on the decline everywhere. Tearfund (2007) reports that membership in Pentecostal churches in the UK has tripled since 1980.
Regular church attendance remains very high in countries such as Nigeria, Pakistan and El Salvador, where the percentage of the population who are at least monthly church goers is 95, 91 and 69% respectively (World Values Survey Dataset, 2009 ).
In recent years, there has been an expanding empirical literature on the determinants of religiosity, exploring cross-country differences in church attendance (see Barro and McCleary, 2003 , 2006a , 2006b . Several studies have demonstrated that GDP per capita, government regulation of the 'religion market' and communist suppression are negative determinants of religiosity, while religious pluralism works in the opposite direction. The negative impact of income per capita is in accordance with the rational choice theory of religiosity of Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) , where religious participation is a time-intensive activity that sacrifices income. Hence, the opportunity cost of religious participation increases with real wages. The negative association between religiosity and government regulation, as well as the corresponding positive correlation with pluralism, confirm the 'religion market' model by Iannaccone (1991) and Iannaccone and Stark (1994) . Their theoretical model predicts that excessive government regulation inhibits competition amongst suppliers of religious services, negatively affecting the quality of their product and religious participation. Barro and McCleary (2003) also confirm that the anti-religion policies of former communist governments still have an enduring impact on religiosity.
In our paper, we contribute to this strand of the literature by exploring the role of life expectancy as an additional determinant of religiosity. Barro and McCleary (2003) find life expectancy to be negatively correlated with religious attendance but pay little attention to the theoretical underpinnings behind the relationship. We believe that much more can be said about the relationship between life expectancy and religiosity, particularly with respect to the time dimension of expected payoffs.
Many people hold the view that there is a link between religiosity and the probability of salvation (or more broadly any afterlife benefits). A poll by Newsweek (2002) revealed that an astounding 75% of respondents believed that their actions on earth determined their access to heaven. In many societies, there is a general belief Papyrakis, E. & Selvaretnam, G. DEV Working Paper 21 6 that entrance to heaven is conditional (to some extent) on cumulative religious effort and good conduct during one's lifetime (see Flynn, 2005) .
We analyse religiosity through a theoretical decision-making framework, where an individual can choose to be religious when young or defer the decision till s/he is old. The analysis separately examines the decision-making problem of young and old individuals with respect to religious participation and confirms the role of life expectancy in postponing religiosity. Demand for religiosity is determined by the relative benefits and costs of religious adherence when alive and in the afterlife. A merit of our analysis lies in studying religiosity through a cost-benefit framework, where decisions at each point in time depend on expected social and spiritual benefits attached to religious adherence, the probability of entering heaven in the afterlife, as well as the costs of formal religion in terms of time allocated to religious activities. In this respect, a higher life expectancy discounts more heavily any expected benefits and costs in the afterlife and is hence likely to lead to postponement of religiosity and ageing congregations. 2 For the same reason, any contemporaneous benefits linked to religious participation (e.g. in the form of expanding a person's social circle, communal activities, spiritual fulfilment, support and guidance) are likely to weigh more heavily in the decision making process compared to what might happen in the less certain and far distant afterlife.
According to our analysis, religious organizations should be hence prepared to attract older members to the congregations, since individuals are likely to postpone the decision of religiosity when life expectancy is high. While many religious organisations place particular emphasis on increasing youth membership, they should not lose sight of incentives needed to attract older people. As part of a successful strategy to increase overall attendance, religious establishments should aim at reducing any discomfort of entry to religious newcomers, both old and young. In light of rising life expectancy, it is important to emphasise contemporaneous socio-spiritual benefits, rather than uncertain rewards in the afterlife. Our theoretical findings are complemented by a cross-sectional empirical analysis, pointing to a significantly negative impact of life expectancy on religiosity.
2 Our analysis is in that respect a discrete-time extension of the Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) model. In our framework, emphasis is placed on life expectancy as a determinant of the timing of religiosity (rather than its quantitative aspects). Contrary to Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) , expected afterlife benefits are dependent on life expectancy and we hence analyze decision-making in different intervals of the life-cycle.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section is devoted to the key elements and assumptions of our theoretical framework. In Section 3, we analyze the decision making of the young and the old, followed by a discussion of the key findings in Section 4. In Section 5, we complement our theoretical analysis with supporting empirical evidence on the nexus between life expectancy and religiosity. Section 6 concludes.
Model Specification
Our analysis makes use of a 3-period model of discrete time, where each individual lives for up to two periods (each representing the young and old intervals of one's lifetime), with the third period representing one's life after death (i.e. afterlife).
Periods tb1 and tb2 refer to the young and old period of an individual's life-cycle respectively, while period ta denotes afterlife. Individuals make decisions in tb1 and tb2 about if and when to become religious by weighing the anticipated costs and benefits of religious adherence when alive and in the afterlife.
Life expectancy and discount factors
Life expectancy is captured in the model by the succession probability λ from the young to the old phase of one's life-cycle. Hence, 1-λ denotes the probability of dying during tb1, while still young.
We assume that individuals place greater weight on earlier periods of consumption (both tangible and intangible) than later ones. We first assume there is a strictly positive rate δb (0<δb<1) that discounts expected utility from the second interval of one's life-cycle (tb2, when old) -relative to the first period (tb1, when young).
Similarly, we assume a strictly positive factor δa (0<δa<1), that discounts expected utility in the afterlife (ta) relative to the preceding period of one's lifetime (either tb1 or tb2, depending on whether life expectancy permits succession from the young to the old phase of one's life-cycle). 3
Worldly Costs and Benefits
We assume that, on average, an old individual's earning power is lower compared to a young counterpart (e.g. see Philip and Gilbert, 2007 for related evidence and 8 discussion). A young individual, hence, derives utility W from income-generating activities, while an old individual enjoys a proportion σ of W during the same period (where 0<σ<1). Furthermore, there is an indirect opportunity cost of religious adherence, which comes in the form of foregone income (see Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975) . Religious participation is a time-intensive process, reducing hence time allocated to income-earning activities. Therefore, in our model, religiosity reduces the income derived utility of an individual by a proportion γ, where 0<γ<1. For this reason, the opportunity cost of religiosity increases with W. This is in line with the negative correlation between religious participation and GDP per capita levels found in empirical studies (see Barro and McLeary, 2006a) .
The model takes into consideration that religious participation involves contemporaneous benefits beyond the aforementioned payoffs anticipated in the afterlife, denoted by B. We assume that religiosity generates contemporaneous benefits for each religious believer, which come in the form of spiritual benefits (i.e. spiritual fulfilment, strength, comfort, guidance) and social benefits (i.e. enlargement of social circle, participation in social activities, social status and acceptance). We assume that these are net benefits adjusted for any non-monetary costs of discomfort of religious participation (allowing hence for the possibility of a negative sign). In times and countries where religious adherents are either prosecuted or socially marginalised (e.g. in the early Christian church), these costs are particularly high (see Bruce, 1993 for a discussion). These may also be associated with the unpleasantness of entering an unfamiliar environment or the cost of gathering information about religious organisations, particularly in countries with a free religious market and limited government regulation -such as the US -with a variety of competing religious "products" (see Finke and Stark, 1992; Finke and Iannaconne, 1993) . 4
Heaven and Hell
Otherworldly compensation in terms of salvation (or damnation if unsuccessful) motivates religious behaviour. Individual perceptions on the existence of heaven and hell in the afterlife and related payoffs will hence influence decisions on religiosity 5 . 4 It is possible to assume that any contemporaneous benefits of religiosity depend positively on γ without loss of generality.
5 Although Buddhism and Hinduism do not acknowledge heaven and hell in the Judeo-Christian theological tradition, adherents believe in being "reincarnated into heavenly intermediate stages" dependent on their behaviour when alive (Barro and McLeary, 2007) .
We assume that an agent, who believes in the existence of heaven and hell, derives utility H from entering heaven, and disutility F from hell.
We attach a probability p to the existence of heaven/hell, reflecting the individual's beliefs on the issue (where 0≤p≤1) 6 . This suggests that irrespective of one's religiosity, individuals expect to derive zero utility after death with (1-p) probability. Our model captures this variation in salvific merit across different religions. We assume that the probability of entering heaven (given personal beliefs on its existence) is π (0≤π≤1) if an individual's religiosity extends to both periods tb1 and tb2. The probability reduces to απ if religiosity is postponed to period tb2, where 0≤α≤1. The dependence of salvation on cumulative effort rather than instantaneous 6 The probability attached to the existence of heaven and hell does not need to be identical, although generally the two are highly correlated (World Value Survey Dataset, 2009). 7 There are also within-country differences in the extent of beliefs in heaven/hell across different religions/denominations (for a US-based survey, see Exline, 2003) .
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10 experiences is particularly embedded in Pentecostalism 8 . On the contrary, other Protestant branches place less emphasis on the duration and cumulative effort in religiosity as determinants of the outcome in afterlife (i.e. α is close to 1).
We also allow for a positive probability of entering heaven even when an individual refrains from being religious during the whole life-cycle (reflecting hence the fact that salvation may be a spiritual gift from God rather than strictly determined by personal behaviour). The probability attached to entering heaven without being religious in any period of one's lifetime is given by επ (where 0≤ε<α). The higher the degree of salvific merit (as it is the case for Buddhism and Catholicism), the larger is expected to be the perceived difference in the salvation probabilities attached to prior religious behaviour (i.e. the difference between π and απ or απ and επ).
The model also takes into consideration that individuals, who decide to be religious in the first period of their life cycle, tb1, may decide to discontinue religious practicing in the second period of their life cycle, tb2. We assign a probability βπ of entering heaven to such de-churched individuals (back-sliders in Christian jargon). Since backsliding is largely disapproved by most religious establishments, we assume that 0≤β<ε, to capture that a back-slider's probability of entering heaven cannot exceed that of someone who either becomes religious in tb2 alone (i.e β<α) or consistently remains non-religious (i.e. β<ε) 9 .
The decision problem
We analyse religiosity through a theoretical decision-making framework, where individuals choose if and when to be religious. They can hence decide to be either 11 religious or non-religious in the first and second period of their life cycle. We analyse separately the decision-making process of the young and the old. Each young individual decides at the beginning of tb1 whether to be religious or defer the decision, weighing the relative costs and benefits of religiosity. We assume, for simplicity, that individuals can only reverse their initial decision on religiosity at the beginning of tb2 but not during the tb1 or tb2 intervals.
The old individual's decision in tb2 depends on her/his earlier decision in tb1. If the prior decision had been to be religious, s/he will now need to decide whether to continue with it or back-slide (become dechurched). If the decision in tb1 had been to defer religious participation, s/he will need to decide whether to become religious in tb2 or continue to abstain (remain consistently unchurched throughout the whole lifecycle). 
Decision analysis
In this section we examine how individuals make decisions on religiosity in the first and second period of their life cycle. We begin by analysing the old individual's decision in tb2. This will help formulate how a young individual makes the decision on religiosity in tb1, taking into account his/her likely religious behaviour when old.
We assume there is perfect information about all parameters introduced in Section 2 and hence that young individuals can forecast religious behaviour in tb2.
Decision-making by the old
The decision-making problem faced by old individuals in tb2 is as follows.
Individuals, who had either become religious or postponed religiosity in tb1 (when young), now revisit their decision on religious adherence. They weigh the expected benefits and costs of religiosity in tb2 and the afterlife, given their prior decision on religiosity in tb1.
We first analyse the decision-making problem of those old individuals, who had previously postponed religious involvement and chose to be non-religious in tb1. An old individual will hence abstain from religious activities, when the net utility of avoiding religiosity exceeds the net utility of religious involvement, as suggested by inequality (1).
(1)
The left-hand-side of the inequality gives the expected net utility of reversing the earlier decision on religiosity when young and joining a religious organization when old. The first component, [(1-γ)σW+B], relates to utility derived from net income adjusted for the opportunity cost of being religious, the net social and spiritual benefits of religiosity and the reduced earning capacity in tb2. The second term δap [απH-(1-απ) F] captures otherworldly net benefits in the afterlife, where the probability of entering heaven is απ, reflecting reduced cumulative effort on achieving salvation (due to earlier religious abstention). These benefits are weighted by p, the probability one attaches to the existence of heaven/hell and discounted by δa, since the present value of afterlife benefits need to be calculated with respect to the second period of one's life-cycle, tb2. The right-hand side captures expected utility under continued religious abstention.
The first component σW captures income-derived utility, while the second term δap [επH-(1-επ) F] refers to the discounted net benefits in the afterlife, with the probability of entering heaven equal to επ, given religious abstention during the whole life-cycle. Inequality (1) can be reduced to,
where Ψ = δapπ(H+F).
We now turn to the second case, where individuals who had decided to be religious in tb1 revisit their decision at the beginning of tb2. They now have to decide whether to remain religious or back-slide (i.e. become dechurched). In this case, the second term of inequality (1) [
which is then reduced to,
Figure 2 summarises the decisions of old individuals according to inequalities (2) and (4) for different income ranges. The choice to be religious or non-religious at each time interval is denoted by R and N respectively. We use a two letter combination to indicate decisions over time with the first letter in parenthesis corresponding to decisions in tb1, and the second letter to tb2. An increase in socio-spiritual benefits, B, will reduce religious abstention by the old, as can be seen from inequalities (2) and (4); in effect, by expanding region I at the expense of region III in Figure 2 . Increased socio-spiritual benefits and/or equivalently a reduction in the discomfort of entry for newcomers render higher levels of income necessary for individuals to abstain from religious participation. A decrease in α and β (or an increase in ε) will have the opposite effect by delinking entry to heaven with prior religious involvement.
10 It can easily be seen that B+Ψ(
Decision-making by the young
In this sub-section we analyse the decision-making problem of individuals who are at the first period of the life-cycle, tb1. A young individual compares the expected benefits and costs of becoming religious without delay against deferring the decision until later, in tb2. We begin by presenting the expected payoffs of a young person under the four possible scenarios outlined in Figure 1 . The choice to be religious or non-religious at each time interval is again denoted by R and N respectively and we use the two letter combination to indicate decisions over time, with the first letter corresponding to decisions in tb1 and the second in parenthesis to tb2.
Scenario N(R): Postpone decision (not religious in tb1) and become religious in tb2.
The payoff to an individual in this scenario is given by expression (5).
W + λδb[(1-γ)σW+B] + λδbδap[απH-(1-απ)F]+ (1-λ)δap[επH-(1-επ)F]. (5)
The first term W captures income-derived utility in tb1, while the second component λδb [(1-γ) σW+B] relates to utility from income in tb2 (adjusted for the costs and benefits of religiosity) when the older individual joins a religious establishment, weighted by the survival probability λ to the second period of one's life-cycle. The third term, λδbδap[απH-(1-απ)F], captures otherworldly net benefits in the afterlife, assuming survival to tb2 with probability λ, where the probability of entering heaven is equal to απ, reflecting reduced cumulative effort on achieving salvation (note that the benefits have also been weighted by p, which is the probability one attaches to the existence of heaven/hell) 11 . The last component, (1-
λ)δap[επH-(1-επ)F], relates to utility from heaven/hell if one dies at the end of tb1
(and is hence discounted by δa alone) without having the opportunity to become religious when old. In this case, the probability of entering heaven is reduced to επ, reflecting the absence of any religious effort.
Scenario N(N): Postpone decision (not religious in tb1) and remain unchurched in tb2.
The expected payoff of consistent religious abstention throughout the whole lifecycle is, 11 Notice, that both discount factors δ a and δ b are used, since the present value of afterlife net benefits need to be calculated with respect to t b1 .
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Note that the first and last terms of expression (5) reappear in expression (6). This is because in both cases the individual chooses to be not religious in tb1, and hence income derived utility in tb1 and expected payoffs in the after life, ta, in case of no succession to tb2 will remain unchanged. Income derived utility in tb2 is given by the second term λδbσW, capturing the decision to remain unchurched in tb2. The third term, the expected payoff in the afterlife assuming succession to the second phase of the life-cycle, now adjusts to λδbδap[επH-(1-επ)F], taking into account a reduced probability of entering heaven, επ, since the individual remains non-religious in both periods.
Scenario R(R):
Be religious in tb1 and remain religious in tb2.
The expected payoff from continuous religiosity is given by expression (7).
[
(1-γ)W+ B] + λδb[(1-γ)σW+ B] + λδbδap[πH-(1-π)F]
The first component [(1-γ)W+B] relates to utility derived from net income in tb1, adjusted for the costs of being religious, as well as the net social and spiritual benefits of religiosity. The second term λδb [(1-γ) σW+ B] captures the same net benefits for the second period of one's lifetime (when old), discounted by δb and weighted by the succession probability λ from the young to the old phase of one's life-cycle. The third term, λδbδap [πH-(1-π)F] , is the discounted expected utility in the afterlife, assuming a succession probability λ to tb2 and the highest probability of entering heaven π due to continuous religiosity. The last term, (1-λ)δap[πH-(1-π)F], captures the net utility from heaven/hell if low life expectancy prevents succession to the older phase of the life-cycle tb2. The probability of entering heaven is again equal to π reflecting prior engagement in religious activities.
Scenario R(N):
Be religious in tb1 and become dechurched in tb2.
The payoff from discontinued religiosity is given by expression (8). Note that the first and last terms are the same as in expression (7). In both scenarios, the individual chooses to be religious in tb1, and hence income derived utility in tb1 and expected payoffs in the afterlife, ta, in case of no succession to tb2 remain the same.
The second term captures income derived utility in tb2 in case of no religiosity. The third term, that captures afterlife benefits assuming succession to tb2, adjusts to λδbδap [βπH-(1-πβ)F] , reflecting the lowest probability of entering heaven of a dechurched individual, βπ. [
(1-γ)W+B] + λδb[(1-γ)σW+B] + λδbδap[πH-(1-π)F]
With some rearrangement, inequality (9) reduces to
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The left-hand-side of inequality (10) (11).
which reduces to,
Again, an increase in life expectancy, captured by λ, makes the postponement condition, given by inequality (12), easier to hold. 13 A young individual in Region III will compare the net expected utility of remaining unchurched during the whole life-cycle -scenario N(N) -with that of immediate religious involvement in period tb1 and backsliding in tb2 -scenario R(N). S/he will 12 The derivative of the left-hand side of expression (10) with respect to  is equal to
. This expression is negative because 0<δ b <1 and α >ε  1-α <1-ε  δ b (1-α)<1-ε . 13 One can prove that the left-hand-side of (12) is strictly decreasing in λ. The first derivative with respect to λ
For this income range, the first derivative of the left-hand-side of expression (12) is [
which then reduces to
We can show that postponement inequality (14) 
Discussion of Results
The decision-making inequalities for the young and the old highlight some of the key factors underpinning overall religious participation and its age structure. We have shown that an increase in life expectancy, λ, leads to postponement of religious participation. A higher life expectancy heavily delays expected benefits in the afterlife and in effect discounts them in current decision-making on religiosity. In poorer countries where life expectancy remains low, a larger share of the population (comprising of both young and older members) is concerned about what happens after death. This result is summarised in the next proposition. 
which always holds since β<ε and 0 <λ, σ,δ b , ε <1.
Proposition 1. An increase in life expectancy, λ, increases postponement of religious
participation.
An important message from the analysis is that given an increase in life expectancy, religious establishments should be prepared to accept and expect a 'greying church', with a membership composition skewed towards the older generation. Particularly for religious doctrines that attach a small 'penalty' to the postponement of religiosity (value of α close to 1), individuals are more likely to decide to postpone.
In view of this anticipated continuous shift in demand for religiosity towards the old, steps should be taken by religious establishments to facilitate access to older members of the society, particularly since many of them will be unchurched. This may involve making information about the organisation easily accessible to them;
assisting new-comers to follow religious activities without feeling lost or uncomfortable; improving the socio-spiritual benefits for the old etc.
This is not to say that youth membership should be downplayed. The negative effect of a higher life expectancy on religiosity -which in effect reduces concern about life after death -can be counterbalanced by using socio-spiritual benefits that can be enjoyed in the present life time as a stimulus for the young to participate.
Inequalities (10) and (12) reveal that an increase in the contemporaneous sociospiritual benefits B, make the postponement condition more difficult to hold. The increase in such socio-spiritual benefits compensate for the loss of time and income as a result of religious involvement and should be pursued by religious establishments as a means to increase religious participation. This result is stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. An increase in socio-spiritual benefits, B, incentivises religious involvement, particularly when life expectancy, λ, is high.
Several other parameters influence religious participation. Large benefits associated with access to heaven (and avoidance of hell) -namely H and F -will tend to stimulate religious involvement. Similarly, a high probability attached to the existence of heaven/hell, p, will also work in the same direction. An increased probability of entering heaven through continuous religious involvement, π, will deter postponement of religious participation, while a reduced probability of entering heaven through continuous religious abstention (captured by a lower value of ε) will have the opposite effect. Furthermore, an increase in α (in effect reducing Papyrakis, E. & Selvaretnam, G. DEV Working Paper 21 21 the penalty of delayed religious participation on after-life benefits) will encourage postponement, especially when the probability of imminent death is low.
The religious parameters in our model (i.e. p, H, F, π, ε, α ,β ) may be treated as exogenous in individual decision-making, reflecting differences across religious doctrines. However, there is room for prominent religious leaders to influence choices by placing emphasis on the magnitude of some of these parameters.
Some Empirical Evidence on Religiosity and Life Expectancy
We estimate cross-country regressions to identify the dependence of religiosity on life expectancy in the tradition of Barro and McCleary (2006a) , which has largely influenced the religion-growth literature. We make use of two dependent variables to proxy religiosity, namely, the share of respondents who self-identify themselves In Table 1 , we estimate the determinants of self-identification as a Religious Person, consecutively alternating the set of explanatory regressors. In regression (1) In column (3) we also incorporate a dummy variable capturing whether the country is or has been communist since 1950 (Communism State). Barro and McCleary (2006a) find that even past communism has a long-lasting and negative impact on religiosity and attendance at religious services. Data on communism are provided by Gallup et al. (1999) . We find adherence to Islam and Catholicism to have a strong positive impact on self-identification as religious, while a communist present or past has the opposite effect (income effects remain insignificant). More importantly for the scope of our analysis, the statistical significance and magnitude of the life expectancy impact on religiosity remains largely unaffected by the inclusion of additional explanatory factors.
In Table 2 , we use the share of respondents who regularly attend religious services (Attendance) as a proxy for religiosity and assess the robustness of the life expectancy-religiosity linkage. Column entries (4)-(6) replicate regressions (1)-(3) of Note: robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% level of significance.
As expected, strong beliefs in heaven, hell and God in some form are strongly and positively correlated with religious attendance. We find similar results when the same regressors are included as additional explanatory variables for religious selfidentification in Table 1 15 . This is an important result by itself. Life expectancy remains a strong negative determinant of religiosity even after controlling for beliefs in heaven, hell and God, which are variables that are strongly associated with attitudes towards religion.
Conclusions
In recent years, religious establishments have been particularly concerned about decreasing religious expression and participation in most parts of the world. In the UK, church attendance has been consistently on the decline in the past 50 years.
Despite the dramatic decrease in religiosity particularly in developed economies, data reveal that the pattern is far from universal. In many sub-Saharan African and Latin American nations, in particular, religious adherence remains strong. Recent theoretical and empirical work has attempted to attribute these diverging patterns in religiosity to several socio-economic variables, including the level of economic development and government regulation of the religion market.
In our paper, we contribute to this strand of the literature by exploring the mediating role of life expectancy in explaining cross-country differences in religious expression, a channel that has so far received little attention in the literature. Decisions on religiosity are inextricably linked to the time dimension of religious costs and anticipated benefits. Most religious beliefs link to some degree the cumulative amount of religious effort to benefits in the afterlife. Increases in life expectancy, in effect, discount these after-life benefits against the life-time costs of religious participation, which often come in the form of sacrificing time and income. Hence, increases in life expectancy encourage postponement of religious involvement, particularly in religion doctrines that do not necessarily link salvation (or afterlife benefits more broadly) to the timing of religiosity. 
